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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BONNEVILLE MANUFACTURING, INC., 
and HUGHES WESTERN SALES, INC., 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
V. No. 940447-CA 
VIOLA L. IRWIN and BEVERLY V. 
THORNBLAD, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
RRTTCT? OF APPFT.T.AMT 
JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals 
is based on a transfer from the Supreme Court 
of Utah under Utah Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 78-2a-
3(2)(k) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court commit an abuse 
of discretion in denying appellant Thornblad's 
motion to vacate the May 3, 1993 judgment for 
1 
attorney,s fees? 
Standard of appellate review: Generally 
the Court of Appeals will reverse a denial of 
a motion to vacate an order or judgment upon a 
showing of abuse of discretion by the trial 
court. Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah 
App. 1992) 
2. Did the trial commit prejudicial 
error as a matter of law when it dismissed 
appellant Viola L. Irwin's counterclaim? 
Standard of appellate review: The 
operative language of Rule 39(a), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, is "[w]hen trial by jury 
has been demanded as provided in Rule 38, 
[Utah Rules of Civil Procedure], the action 
shall be designated upon the register of 
actions as a jury action. The trial of all 
issues so demanded shall be by jury, . . ." 
It must be concluded from the quoted language 
that the rule prohibits a trial court from 
2 
denying a litigant a jury trial if proper 
demand has been made and there is no waiver as 
provided in said Rule 39. The standard of 
review for the trial court's interpretation of 
Rule 39 is correction of error. Ong Intern. 
(U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 
447 (Utah 1993); Murdock v. Springville Mun. 
Corp., 878 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994). 
A judgment or order is void and subject 
to attack if the court that rendered it acted 
in a manner inconsistent with due process of 
law. Aguchak v. Montgomery Ward Co. Inc. , 520 
P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1974). The Court of Appeals 
applies its independent judgment when 
reviewing issue which represents a 
constitutional question. Arco Alaska,. Inc. v. 
State, 824 P.2d 708 (Alaska 1992) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, RULES AND STATUTES 
Art. I, Sec. 7, [DUE PROCESS OF LAW] No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
3 
Art. I, Sec. 10, [TRIAL BY JURY] In 
capital cases the right of trial by jury shall 
remain inviolate. In courts of general 
jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury 
shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of 
inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of 
four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict 
shall be unanimous. Incivil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A 
jury in civil cases shall be waived unless 
demanded. 
Rule 38, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 38, Jury trial of right. 
(a) Right preserved. The right of 
trial by jury as declared by the constitution 
or as given by statute shall be preserved to 
the parties. 
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a 
rial by jury of any issue triable of right by 
a jury by paying the statutory jury fee and 
serving upon the other parties a demand 
therefore in writing at any time after the 
commencement of the action and not later than 
10 days after the service of the last pleading 
directed to such issue. Such demand may be 
endorsed upon a pleading of the party. 
(c) Same: Specification of issues. 
In his demand a party may specify the issues 
which he wishes so tried; otherwise he shall 
be deemed to have demanded trial by jury for 
all the issues so triable. If he has demanded 
trial by jury for only some of the issues, any 
other party, within 10 days after service of 
the demand or such lesser time as the court 
may order, may serve a demand for trial by a 
jury of any other or all of the issues of fact 
in the action. 
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to 
4 
pay the statutory fee, to serve a demand as 
required by this rule and o file it as 
required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by 
him of trial by jury. A demand for trial by 
jury made as herein provide may not be 
withdrawn without the consent of the parties, 
parties. 
Rule 39. Trial by jury or by the court. 
(a) By jury. When trial by jury has 
been demanded as provided in Rule 38, the 
action shall be designated upon the register 
of actions as a jury action. The trial of all 
issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless 
(1) The parties or their attorneys 
of record, by written stipulation filed with 
the court or by an oral stipulation made in 
open court and entered in the record, consent 
to trial by the court sitting without a jury, 
or 
(2) The court upon motion or of its 
own initiative finds that a right of trial by 
jury of some or all of those issues does not 
exist, or 
(3) Either party to the issue fails 
to appear at the trial. 
(b) By the court. Issues not demanded 
for trial by jury as provided in Rule 38 shall 
be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding 
the failure of a party to demand a jury in an 
action in which such a demand might have been 
made of right, the court in its discretion 
upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any 
or all issues. 
(c) Advisory jury and trial by 
consent. In all actions not triable of right 
by a jury the court upon motion or of its own 
initiative may try any issue with an advisory 
jury or, with the consent of both parties, may 
order a trial with a jury whose verdict has 
5 
the same effect as if trial by the jury had 
been a matter of right. 
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
RULE 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
* * * 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable 
neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, 
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are 
just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . 
(6) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment 
upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Bonneville and Hughes Western [herein 
"Bonneville"] instituted this partition action 
against Viola L. Irwin [herein "Irwin"] and 
Beverly V. Thornblad [herein "Thornblad"] that 
involves Irwin's residence. (r. 2-6) 
Thornblad, who is Irwin's daughter, possessed 
the record title to the residence. (r. 16) 
Irwin counterclaimed against Bonneville for 
wrongful execution. (r. 19-21) She demanded 
trial by jury. (r. 26-27) 
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After a bench trial judgment was entered 
granting partition. (r. 224-226) [Appendix 
A-l - A-3] The judgment provided Tt]hat 
[Thornbladl shall sign and execute any and all 
documents necessary . . . to have the property 
sold and upon Thornblad's failure to sign and 
execute any documents . . . to sell the 
rproperty] then upon Motion of TBonneville] 
the court will sign and execute said documents 
on behalf of said [Thornblad]. (r. 225) As 
to Irwin's counterclaim the trial court in its 
conclusions of law held lf[t]hat there was 
insufficient evidence to support [Irwin's] 
counterclaim.11 (r. 223) The trial court 
granted judgment "in favor of [Bonneville] on 
[Irwin's] counterclaim, no cause of action." 
(r. 225) 
On May 26, 1993, an appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court was perfected, (r. 827-828) In 
connection with the appeal [Sup.Ct. 930272] 
7 
and upon appellants7 [Irwin, Thornblad, Irwin] 
motion for summary disposition (r. 1020-1035), 
on September 24, 1993, the trial court's 
judgment was reversed and the case was 
"remanded for further proceedings on the 
counterclaim." (r. 992-994) [Appendix A-4-6] 
On May 3, 1993 a judgment was entered 
against Thornblad awarding Bonneveille $3,375 
for attorney's fees. (r. 800-801) [Appendix 
A-7-8] On October 4, 1993, after the 
remittitur of the Utah Supreme Court (r. 992-
994), Thornblad by motion requested that the 
May 3, 1993, judgment for $3,375 be vacated 
pursuant to URCivP 60(b)(6). (r. 999-1000, 
1015-1017) [Appendix A-9-11, 12-14]. 
Thornblad requested that the matter be 
submitted for decision on October 18, 1993. 
(r. 1014) 
On November 1, 1993, the trial judge 
scheduled the matter for non-jury trial on 
8 
January 3, 1994. On November 2, 1993, the 
trial judge again scheduled a non-jury trial 
for January 3, 1994. (r. 1045) On December 
17, 1994, Bonneville's attorney moved the 
trial court for an order continuing the trial 
pending a ruling from another judge in a 
related case. (r. 1048-1049) Irwin and 
Thornblad did not oppose the motion. On 
December 29, 1993, Bonneville's attorney 
requested a ruling on the motion for 
continuance. (r. 1050-1050A) Irwin did not 
appear on January 3, 1994, because the 
scheduling order was for non-jury trial and 
she had demanded a jury trial on her 
counterclaim. Thornblad did not appear on 
January 3, 1994, because she was not involved 
in the trial on Irwin's counterclaim and the 
record was complete on her motion to vacate 
the May 3, 1993, judgment for attorney's fees. 
By minute entry the trial court ruled that 
9 
If[b]ased upon the non appearance of 
defendants, the Court denies the relief 
requested in the Counter-claim [sic]. The 
Sheriff Deed is now appropriate. The Court 
finds that the Counter claim [sic] fails as a 
matter of law and is dismissed on the merits. 
The prior orders entered in this matter will 
stand. The judgment on fees and costs 
stands." (r. 1051) On April 25, 1994, an 
order was entered in effect denying 
Thornblad's motion to vacate the May 3, 1993, 
judgment, and adjudging against Irwin on her 
counterclaim, (r. 1059-1062) [Appendix A-15-
18] This appeal followed. (r. 1063) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. On March 26, 1993, the trial court 
allowed the judgment for attorney's fees 
sought to be vacated by Thornblad in terms 
following, to-wit, "I will allow attorney's 
fees on the motion to sign the listing and the 
10 
related appearances, and court expenses that 
the plaintiff has incurred, and the motion 
here for requiring the defendant Thornblad to 
execute the earnest money sales agreement. 
Attorney's fees will be allowed in that 
regard. 
"This is the proposed judgment that 
you've [Bonneville's attorney Nemelka] 
submitted for $3,375? . . . Haven't I ordered 
[Thornblad] to sign it based upon the judgment 
I've entered . . .haven't I ordered 
[Thornblad] to sign a document in accordance 
with judgments that have been entered 
heretofore?" (r. 1015-1016) 
The partition judgment (reversed) was 
therefore a necessary element of the judgment 
for attorneys fees and comes within the 
definition of a prior judgment upon which the 
judgment for attorney's fees is based as 
mentioned in URCivP 60(b)(6). 
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2. Under the facts and circumstances of 
this case any trial on Irwin7s counterclaim 
would have required a jury and the trial 
court, in violating URCivP 39(a) by scheduling 
the trial as non-jury, and proceeding to a 
hearing without a jury, committed reversible 
error of constitutional dimension. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
1. Thornblad's motion to vacate must 
meet the requirement of Rule 60(b)(6) that the 
order which she seeks to have vacated is based 
upon a prior judgment that has been reversed. 
The requirement is satisfied if it is shown 
that the prior judgment is a necessary element 
of the judgment sought to be vacated, giving 
rise to the cause of action. 7 Moore's 
Federal Practice (1983), para. 60.26[3]; Vol. 
11, Wright & Miller, Sec. 2863; Kelly v. 
Scott, 5 Utah 2d 159, 298 P.2d 821 (1956) 
The partition judgment required Thornblad 
12 
to sign a listing agreement as well as all 
documents necessary to have the property sold. 
The judgment for attorney's fees was allowed 
Bonneville for "the motion here for requiring 
defendant to execute the earnest money sales 
agreement" which the partition judgment 
requires her to sign. The partition judgment 
is therefore a necessary element of the claim 
for attorney's fees allowed by the May 3, 1993 
judgment. The trial court committed an abuse 
of discretion in refusing to vacate the 
attorney's fee judgment where the partition 
judgment upon which it is based was reversed. 
2. It was reversible error for the trial 
court to schedule a non-jury trial on Irwin's 
counterclaim. Rule 39 is mandatory in its 
requirement that where a jury is appropriately 
demanded, "trial of all issues so demanded 
shall be by jury . . . " Where Irwin's right 
to jury trial was established in accordance 
13 
with the requirements of Rule 38, the trial 
court could not deny her that right without 
violating even minimal standards of due 
process. Klimas v. Mabryr 599 F.2d 842 (8th 
Cir. 1979) 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants Irwin and Thornblad therefore 
respectfully request that the trial court's 
order of April 25, 1994 (r. 1059-1062) be in 
all things reversed and that the matter be 
remanded to the trial court with instructions 
to enter its order vacating the May 3, 1993 
judgment for attorney's fees, and to schedule 
trial to a jury of Irwin's counterclaim 
against Bonneville. 
Dated October 31, 1994. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
John w. Buckley 
Appellants' Attorney 
364 West 3900 North 
Provo, Utah 84604 
14 
Tele.: 801/223 9595 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
On October 31, 1994, two copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT mailed as 
follows: 
Richard S. Nemelka 
2046 East 4800 South, Ste. 103 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 




JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF SALE 
(r. 224-226) A-l 
REMITTITUR (r. 992-994) A-4 
JUDGMENT [May 3, 1993] 
(r. 800-801) A-7 
MOTION FOR ORDER VACATING JUDGMENT 
(r. 999-1000) A-9 
DEFENDANT THORNBLAD'S REPLY TO 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR 
ORDER VACATING JUDGMENT (r. 1015-1017) A-l 
ORDER [appealed herein] (r. 1059-1062) A-l 
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RICHARD S. NEMELKA NO. S3»e 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2046 EAST 4800 SOUTH 
SUITE 103 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84117 
(801)272-4244 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF SALE 
Civil No. 900905623 PR 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
BONNEVILLE MANUFACTURING, 
HUGHES WESTERN SALES, INC. 
vs 
Plaintiffs, 
VIOLA L. IRWIN, 
BEVERLY V. THORNBLAD, 
Defendants. 
INC., ) 
* r * 
The trial in the above-entitled matter came on regularly 
for hearing on the 5th day of November, 1992, before the 
Honorable Timothy Hanson; Plaintiff, Bonneville Manufacturing, 
Inc., being present and being represented by its attorney, 
Richard S. Nemelka, and Defendant, Viola Irwin, being present and 
both Defendants being represented by their attorney, John 
Buckley, and witnesses having been called and evidence presented 
to the Court and arguments having been made and the Court having 
been fully advised, the court made and entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law : 
00224 
IT IS NOW HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Judgement is granted in favor of plaintiff on 
defendant's counterclaim, no cause of action. 
: 2. That the property located at 8278 Ashley Avenue, 
I Sandy, Utah, more particularly described as Lot 52, Willow Creek 
Subdivision No. 3, except the Northwesterly five (5) feet 
thereof, shall be sold forthwith in a commercially reasonable 
| fashion to get the most money from the sale of said property. 
i Further in the event the property cannot be sold for more than 
j the amount due and owing to United Savings to satisfy their Trust 
Deed, then the property shall not be sold. 
i 3. That defendant Thornblad shall sign and execute any 
j and all documents necessary to obtain a listing agent to have the 
i 
j property listed and further any and all documents necessary to 
j have the property sold. 
4. That if defendant Thornblad fails to sign and execute 
j any documents to list the subject property and to sell the same 
I 
! 
j then upon Motion of the plaintiff the court will sign and execute 
| said documents on behalf of said defendant. 
] 
J 5. That the proceeds received from the sale of said 
property after the costs of sale and the underlying obligations 
to United Savings Loan are paid shall either be distributed 1/3 
to plaintiff and 2/3 to defendant Thornblad pursuant to an 
agreement of the parties, otherwise the money shall be 
-2-
00225 
placed in an interest bearing account deposited with the court 
until such time that the court directs the dispersement of the sam^ 
; 6. That plaintiff is awarded judgment against the 
defendants Viola L. Irwin, and Beverly J. Thornblad, for 
plaintiff's costs in the sum of $133.00^ with interest accruing j 
at 12% per annum, 
,~2_ day o/No^mi^g% 1992. DATED this 
BY fHE COURT: 
//^V. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed copies of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Order of Sale 
on the 6th day of November, 1992 by United States mail, first 
class postage prepaid addressed to: 
John Buckley 
Attorney at Law 
1647 North Willowbrook Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
00226 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Regular May Term, 1993 September 24, 1993 
Bonneville Manufacturing, Inc., 
a Utah corporation; Hughes Western 
Sales, Inc., REMITTITUR 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, No. 930272 
D i s t r i c t No. 900905623 
v . FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
V i o l a L. I r w i n , Rodney H. I r w i n , 
B e v e r l y V. T h o r n b l a d ,
 C C D q n JQQQ 
D e f e n d a n t s and A n n e l l a n t s . x^&tr 3D ERW p p e l l a n t s . 
COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
Plaintiff's motion to dismiss this appeal on the 
ground that it was not filed in a timely manner, is hereby 
denied. The motion to amend the judgment, filed on Monday, 
December 14, 1992, was timely from the entry of the judgment 
on December 2, 1992, and extended the time to appeal until the 
motion was denied on May 26, 1993, the day the notice of 
appeal was filed. Since the ten day period allowed for filing 
a motion to amend fell on Saturday, December 12, Defendants 
had until the following Monday, the 14th to file the motion. 
See rule 6, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiff's motion for summary affirmance of the 
judgment appealed from is denied. 
Defendant's motion to reverse the judgment appealed 
is hereby granted. The trial court erred in not adjudicating 
defendant Viola Irwin's counterclaim for wrongful execution. 
The sheriff's deed, basp.d on t-h^  NrwomHor- Q IQQQ -;,-,^ ~™~~4- r\ 
may well be void since it appears that judgment wa& 
interlocutory and not a final judgment. See court of appeals 
memorandum decision in Bonneville Manufacturing Ins. v. Irwin, 
No. 900492-CA, dated August 2, 1991. A writ of execution may 
only be issued on a final judgment, and execution on a 
judgment which is not final has no effect. See D'aston v. 
Aston. 844 P.2d 345 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 54. 
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings on the 
counterclaim. 
Issued: September 29, 1993 
Record: None 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
State of Utah ) 
/ ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, GEOFFREY J. BUTLER, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, do 
hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct copy of the }\4&&MMg£&®[%4x 
order entered 
in the foregoing entitled action, now of record and on file in my office. 
In Testimony Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 
and affixed the seal of said Supreme Court this 
the I^^yr?!.1}.?]}. 
day of ...S£p.t.emb.er A.D. 19 ....9.1.. 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk, Supreme Court 
By .... J l \ \ * ^ 
Deputy Clerk 
/ 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judioiat District 
MAY " 3 1993 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2046 EAST 4800 SOUTH 
SUITE 103 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84117 
(801) 272-4244 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BONNEVILLE MANUFACTURING, 
A Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
V • 
VI IRWIN, et al., 
Defendants. 
INC., 
) J U D G M E N T 
) Civil No. 900905623 PR 
) Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
I Based upon the previous Order of the Court awarding to 
plaintiff a judgment against Beverly Thornblad for attorney's 
fees and the Affidavit of the plaintiff's attorney having been 
filed with the above-entitled Court on the 15th of April, 1993, 
and having been mailed to defendant's counsel on the 15th of 
J April, 1993 and defendant having failed to file any Objections 
under the statutory time period and the Court having reviewed the 
file and good cause appearing therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
c: *Jtt 
r ' '» 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiff, Bonneville 
Manufacturing, Inc., a Utah Corporation, be and the same is 
hereby granted judgment against the defendamt, Beverly Thornblad, 
in the sum of $3,375.00 with interest accruing thereon at the 
rate of twelve percent (12%) per aiymm. 
DATED this S day of-Ap&rl, 1993. 
T* 
TUDGE TIMOTHY R:. HANSON * T T E 3 T 
District Court Judge^ /*y / 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING *f * ~ — 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Judgment to John W. Buckley, Attorney for Defendants, 1647 North 
Willowbrook Drive, Provo, Utah 84604, this 29th day of April, 
1993, postage prepaid. 
— / 
r ^  -
<J v.' O 
BEVERLY THORNBLAD, Pro Se 
749 East Garden Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone 801 466 9208 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 4 1993 
y £ //$UbLAK?COUNTY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BONNEVILLE MANUFACTURING, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
VIOLA L. IRWIN, RODNEY H. 
IRWIN and BEVERLY V. 
THORNBLAD, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR ORDER VACATING 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900905623 PR 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Defendant, Beverly V. Thornblad, herewith moves the court for 
an order setting aside and vacating that certain JUDGMENT entered 
by the Court in May, 1993, for the sum of $3,375.00, in favor of 
the above named plaintiff and against this defendant, on the 
grounds and for the reasons that a prior judgment, viz., JUDGMENT 
AND ORDER OF SALE entered by the Court on December 2, 1992, upon 
which the May 1993 JUDGMENT is based, was reversed by the Utah 
Supreme Court by ORDER dated September 24, 1993, in case #930272; 
a true copy of the said ORDER of the Utah Supreme Court is hereunto 
appended. On September 29, 1993, the case was remitted by the Utah 
Supreme Court to the above named Court. 
This motion is made and based upon Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) 
which provides that on motion and upon such terms as are iust the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgmentr order, or proceeding . 
00CJ$3 
.[where] the judgment has been satisifed, released. or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated. This is the pure federal rule as 
contained in (FRCiP) Rule 60(b)(5). For a decision to be based on 
a prior judgment within the meaning of the rule, the prior judgment 
must be a necessary element of the decision, giving rise to the 
cause of action. 7 Moored Federal Practice 1983), Para. 60.26[3]. 
Vol. 11, Wright & Miller, Sec. 2863. The May 1993 JUDGMENT is for 
attorney's fees incurred in the plaintiff's enforcement of the 
December 2, 1992 JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF SALE. Clearly then, the 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF SALE is a necessary element of the May 1993 
JUDGMENT here sought to be vacated. 
This motion is made and based upon the within motion, the 
files and records in this case, and the files and records in 
#930272, Utah Supreme Court. 
DATED October 1, 1993. 
n 
BEVERLY $. ^THORNBLAD 
On October / 1993, true copy of the foregoing mailed to 
Richard S. Nemelka, 2046 East 4800 South, Suite 103, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84117. 
BEVERLY "V. THORNBLAD 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-00O00-
Regular May Term, 1993 September 24, 1993 
Bonneville Manufacturing, Inc., 
a Utah corporation; Hughes Western 
Sales, Inc., 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 930272 
Viola L. Irwin, Rodney H. Irwin, 900905623PR 
Beverly v. Thornblad, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
ORDER 
Plaintiff's motion to dismiss this appeal on the ground 
that it was not filed in a timely manner, is hereby denied. 
The motion to amend the judgment, filed on Monday, 
December 14, 1992, was timely from the entry of the judgment 
on December 2, 1992, and extended the time to appeal until 
the motion was denied on May 26, 1993, the day the notice of 
appeal was filed. Since the ten day period allowed for 
filing a motion to amend fell on Saturday, December 12, 
Defendants had until the following Monday, the 14th to file 
the motion. See rule 6, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiff's motion for summary affirmance of the 
judgment appealed from is denied. 
Defendant's motion to reverse the judgment appealed is 
hereby granted. The trial court erred in not adjudicating 
defendant Viola Irwin's counterclaim for wrongful execution. 
The sheriff's deed, based en the November 8, 1988 judgment, 
may well be void since it appears that judgment was 
interlocutory and not a final judgment. See court of appeals 
memorandum decision in Bonneville Manufacturing Ins. v. 
Irwin, No, 900492-CA, dated August 2, 1991. A writ of 
execution may only be issued on a final judgment, and 
execution on a judgment which is not final has no effect. 
See D'aston v. Aston. 844 P.2d 345 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 54. 
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings on the 
counterclaim. 
For the 
^ « ^ n n P Hall 
» A M 
OiP; 
BEVERLY V. THORNBLAD, Defendant Pro],Sag , 
794 East Garden Avenue ' U5 fM JJ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 * ._ 
Telephone 801 466 9208 ^3
 a >^ >; '—*£ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BONNEVILLE MANUFACTURING, INC., 
a Utah corporation, DEFENDANT THORNBLAD'S REPLY 
TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPSONSE TO 
Plaintiff, MOTION FOR ORDER VACATING 
V, JUDGMENT 
VIOLA L. IRWIN, RODNEY H. IRWIN Civil No. 900905623 PR 
and BEVERLY V. THORNBLAD, 
Defendants. 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Defendant Thornblad herewith replies to the response of 
plaintiff to Thornblad's motion for order vacating judgment as 
follows, to-wit: 
1. Plaintiff's first claim (para. 1) is that the judgment 
here sought to be vacated was "based upon [Thornblad's] contempt 
for failing to comply with the Orders of the Court." At a hearing 
on March 26, 1993, in response to plaintiff's counsel's request for 
attorney's fees "for having to respond to this motion, and also for 
attorneys'fees for having to bring the other two motions before the 
Court" [tr. p. 31], Judge Hanson responded "[w]ith regard to the 
request for attorneys' fees, I'm not going to allow attorneys' fees 
for responding to the defendant's post-trial motions, but I will 
allow attorney's fees on the motion to sign the listing and the 
related appearances, and court expenses that the paintiff has 
incurred, and the motion here for requiring the defendant Thornblad 
oiojn 
to execute the eanest money sales agreement. Attorney's fees will 
be allowed in that regard." [tr. p 36]. Then at the hearing on 
May 3, 1993, plaintiff's counsel addressed Judge Hanson as follows, 
"Your Honor, in the outstanding motion for attorneys' fees, can we 
have that decided by Friday as well? We filed affidavits, and 
requests for ruling. There's been no objection to the affidavits 
that we filed pursuant to the previous order of the Court."; and 
Judge Hanson responded "This is the proposed judgment that you've 
submitted for $3,375?" Mr. Nemelka, "That's correct." [tr. p. 
17]. Then at the contempt hearing on May 28, 1993, Judge Hanson 
queried, perhaps rhetorically, "* * *78-32- — looks like section 
78-32-1 sub-5. Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or 
process of the Court. Havn't I ordered [Thornblad] to sign it 
based upon the judgment I've entered? then repeating, "[h]aven't I 
ordered [Thornblad] to sign a document in accordance with judgments 
that have been entered heretofore?" [tr. pp. 5,6]. 
2. The foregoing is also applicable against the contention of 
plaintiff as made in paragraph 2 of its response that the judgment 
here sought to be vacated "was not based upon a prior judgment but 
based upon said defendant's refusal to comply with the Orders of 
the Court. 
3. As to plaintiff's contention made in paragraph 3 "that the 
prior judgment has not been reversed or vacated", the September 24, 
1993 Order of the Supreme Court states "Defendant's motion to 
reverse the judgment appealed is hereby granted. * * * "Reversed 
and remanded for further proceedings on the counterclaim." 
-2-
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WHEREFORE, defendant Thornblad requests that the Court 
dissalow plaintiff's response and objections to defendant's motion 
and that defendant's said motion be in all things allowed and 
granted. 
DATED October 18, 1993. 
BEVERLY V5!.THORNBLAD 
On October 18, 1993, true copy mailed to Richard S. Nemelka at 
2046 East 4800 South, Suite 103, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117. 
BEVERLY V. THORNBLAD 
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RICHARD S. NEMELKA NO. 2 3 9 0 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2046 EAST 4800 SOUTH 
SUITE 103 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84117 
(801)272-4244 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BONNEVILLE MANUFACTURING INC., ) O R D E R 
HUGHES WESTERN SALES, INC., ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs ) 
) Civil No. 900905623 PR 
VIOLA L. IRWIN, ) 
BEVERLY V. THORNBLAD, ) JUDGE TIMOTHY H. HANSON 
Defendants. ) 
The trial in the above-entitled matter on the counterclaim 
of the defendant pursuant to the remand of the Utah Appellate 
Court and a hearing on all outstanding motions including but not 
limited to the motion to vacate the judgment, came on regularly 
for hearing before the Honorable Timothy Hanson of the 
above-entitled court on the 3rd day of January, 1994, at the hour 
of 2:00 p.m. Plaintiff was represented by its attorney, Richard 
S. Nemelka, and defendants having failed to appear and no counsel 
having appeared for and in behalf of the defendants, and the 
court having waited until 2:35 p.m. on said date, still none of 
the defendants appearing or representing themselves or having 
counsel appear, and the court having reviewed the file and having 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
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indicated that a notice of the trial date for January 3, 1994 at 
the hour of 2:00 p.m. had been sent to all of the parties 
including the defendants and plaintiffs having indicated that 
they had received said notice and a notice not having been 
returned to the court, a discussion having been held between 
counsel for the plaintiff and the court in regard to the ruling 
in Judge Iwasaki's court and to the sheriff's deed, the issues 
that pertained to the apparent concerns of the former Chief 
Justice Halls1 1993 order, said concerns having been mooted by 
the actions of Judge Iwasaki in the matter before his court, 
plaintiff having withdrawn its motion to continue the trial and 
the court having further found that none of the defendants had 
made any inquiry to the court about the trial date of January 3, 
1994, and having reviewed the file and all pleadings, and good 
cause appearing therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That the relief requested in the counterclaim by 
Defendant Viola Irwin be and the same is hereby denied for the 
following two (2) reasons: 
a. The first reason is that the concern addressed by 
the Supreme Court that there was not a final judgment upon which 
the sheriff's deed was issued in Judge Iwasaki's case, formerly 
Judge Daniels, may very well affect the counterclaim in this case 
and that the proceedings before 
flinfcfl 
formerly Judge Daniels, now Judge Iwasaki, and that the 
proceedings before the former Judge Daniels, now Judge Iwasaki, 
were ineffective. That is the substance of the counterclaim to 
vacate Judge Daniels' order. That defect has been remedied, 
assuming a nunc pro tunc order is appropriate in Judge Iwasaki's 
case. It appears to the court that the decision by Judge Iwasaki 
resolves the concerns by the former Chief Justice Hall in 
remanding this matter as it relates to the substance of the 
partition action here in this court's apparent failure to deal 
with Defendant Viola Irwin's counterclaim. This is resolved 
by Judge Iwasaki entering an order that makes the sheriff's deed 
appropriate and that it was appropriate to proceed on the 
partition action and the court as a matter of law holds in this 
case because of Judge Iwasaki's proposed nunc pro tunc action 
with regard to the finality of that judgment, that the 
counterclaim of the defendant, Viola Irwin, fails as a matter of 
law in this action on the merits and based thereon is dismissed. 
b. Further, the court finds that the Defendant was 
given notice of this hearing and the court has not received 
anything back that she did not receive it. She has corresponded 
with the court previously. Based upon Defendant Irwin's failure 
to appear, the court holds and rules as a matter of law that she 
has failed to meet her burden of proof and based thereon the 
counterclaim of Defendant Viola Irwin is dismissed, no cause of 
action on said counterclaim. 
01061 
2. In regard to Defendant Beverly Thornblad's motion to 
vacate the award of attorneys fees, this court finds that 
Defendant Thornblad did not appear at this hearing after 
receiving notice of the same. The court also finds that 
Defendant Thornblad's position was an incorrect statement of 
the law, and therefore Defendant Thornblad's motion to vacate 
the judgment be and the same is hereby denied and the judgment 
for attorneys fees and costs related to Defendant Thornblad's 
contempt will remain in place. 
All outstanding motions not addressed herein, are hereby 
dismissed. The Court's prior order with regard to the four 
causes of action and the partition itself will stand. The 
orders and judgments of this case aire final. 
DATED this ^JTday of Apcll, 1994. 
BY /THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
ATTEST 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Order on the 8th day of April, 1994, by United States mail, 
first class postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Michael F. Olmstead, Attorney at Law, 2650 Washington 
Blvd. Suite 102, Ogden, Utah 84401, 
